Motivated by the quantum Fourier transform (QFT), a sequential quantum multiparty signature (QMS) scheme is proposed. Several signatories jointly accomplish the task in a chaotic encryption system. Alice generates and sends the encrypted message with the quantum Fourier transform. Signatories provide individual signatures in a certain order, while Bob verifies the authenticity of the combined multiple signatures after the eavesdropping check phase with help of the arbitrator. Analysis shows the correctness and security of the proposed scheme. This QMS protocol increases the efficiency of verification compared to arbitrated quantum signatures and broadcasting multiparty signature. This QMS protocol will be widely used for online e-government and e-business systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of cryptography, a digital signature is a digital simulation of a hand-written signature in real life and an implementation method for signing electronic documents [1] . The digital signature is one of the core technologies of information security and one of the technologies on which e-commerce and e-government depend. In reality, sometimes two or more signers may be required to agree jointly in a digital signature. The digital signature can be solved by the identity-based sequential aggregate signatures. The concept of multisignature (multisig) was proposed by Itakura et al., allowing multiple signers to collectively complete a task by a single compact signature [2] , [3] . The multi-party signatures are not equivalent to group and ring signatures. The significant difference is that a multiparty signature is one that everyone needs to sign, and the collection of signatures is verified only once. Group and ring signatures provide anonymity for signers, allow one signer to sign anonymously on behalf of a collection of members [4] .
According to the different execution processes, there are two types of multisig: the sequential multisig and the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Soon Xin Ng . broadcasting multisig. In the sequential multisig schemes, multiple signers sign the same message in a certain order. The application of multisig includes three main aspects: ecommerce, property division and capital supervision. Multisig is being applied to traditional electronic computers with public-key cryptosystem. Nevertheless, the enormous computing power of the quantum computer will threaten the classical multisig protocols with only mathematically difficult embedded cryptography [5] , [6] . To withstand the attacks of quantum computing, a series of secure communication protocols has been developed using quantum algorithms, including quantum key distribution (QKD) [7] - [9] , quantum secret sharing (QSS) [10] , [11] , quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [12] - [14] , quantum private comparison (QPC) [15] - [17] and quantum identity authentication (QIA) [18] , [19] .
In 2002, Zeng and Keitel proposed a pioneering arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) protocol with Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states, which provided an elementary model of the quantum signature [20] . Many scholars have designed signature protocols based on this model [21] - [23] . However, cryptanalysis of the AQS protocols has been proposed [24] - [26] . In theory, an AQS protocol can complete the task of multiple signatures by performing the protocol repeatedly for each signer and verifier. It is an interesting to consider that whether a quantum signature protocol can be designed in a way that allow the message to be signed by multiple parties. In 2007, Wen's team [27] first developed a quantum multisig (QMS) scheme via quantum teleportation. In 2011, Shi et al. proposed a proxy group QMS for the entangled state messages with quantum Fourier transform (QFT) [28] . In 2012, Shi et al proposed a threshold QMS with irregular QFT [29] . In 2014, Wen's team proposed a QMS scheme for blind message [30] . Security analysis about QMS schemes are presented by researchers [31] - [34] .
Here, we analyze the above protocols and find they are broadcasting QMS. Compared with executions of AQS multiple times, the efficiency of proposed broadcasting QMS scheme has no obvious advantages. Such broadcasting QMS scheme usually consumes multiple sets of entangled quantum resources, and the measurement results of each signer need to be collected and verified, one by one. To improve the efficiency of broadcasting QMS protocol, a secure sequential QMS protocol is proposed based on QFT. The high dimensional quantum states with decoy states are traveling among the signatories. In addition to QFT processing, the chaotic system in this new scheme generates a permutation key string which not only has a good pseudorandom performance but can also be constantly updating. In other words, although the participants share the private quantum key only once, the updated private keys can be generated when necessary for the next round of protocol, so that it can effectively economize quantum resources. The randomly selected samples are measured by the arbitrator, which increase the safety against participant attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we show the skew tent chaotic map algorithm with its chaotic behavior. In Section III, the details of our sequential QMS, including initial phase, individual signing phase, combined multiple signature phase, eavesdropping check phase and verification phase, are described. Section IV discusses the correctness and the security of the proposed QMS protocol. Finally, we provide the method that enables the proposed protocol to be carried out at a lower level and conclude this work by indicating its security and practical value in Section V.
II. CHAOTIC ENTANGLEMENT ENCRYPTION
Chaos theory, which has been established since the 1970s, concerns a state of disorder in which behavior can actually be predetermined [35] . The most well-known characteristics of chaos are the so-called ''butterfly-effect'' (the sensitivity to the initial conditions) and the pseudorandomness generated by deterministic equations. These properties are applied to the image encryption, information hiding and other fields, since the properties can be used to meet the requirements of mixing and diffusion in the sense of cryptography [36] - [38] .
A. THE SKEW TENT CHAOTIC MAP (STCM)
Here, we consider a chaotic entanglement encryption algorithm that permutes the elements of a sequence related to the position string of a chaotic system. The STCM is a simple chaotic system, where the sensitivity to initial values and the correlation between iterative track sequences decrease exponentially [39] .
Formally, the mathematical model of STCM is defined as follows [40] :
A pair of parameters (x 0 , p), where x 0 ∈ [0, 1] and p ∈ (0, 1) denotes an initial condition. The iterative track sequences have characteristics of pseudorandomness, which can be employed for encrypting information directly.
B. CHAOTIC ENTANGLEMENT ENCRYPTION BASED ON CHAOTIC POSITION STRING
As the chaotic entanglement encryption scheme involves only the permutation of the plain text,we summarize its encryption steps as follows.
(1) Iterate the STCM algorithm x i+1 = f p (x i ) in Eq.(1) n times and obtain a sequence X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }.
(2) Arrange the n elements in X according to value and achieve the transformed sequenceX = {x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x n }.
(3) Seek out the position of the elementx i in X, and record the positions
wherex i is the exact value of x r i . The sequence R is employed as the chaotic position string. (4) Shuffle the values of the initial sequential string M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } by R and obtain stringM .
To fully demonstrate the chaotic behavior ofX , we assume that the initial parameter p = 0.4 for simplicity. As shown in Fig. 1 , chaotic behaviors of stringsX are obtained from the STCM system with three different initial parameters: x 0 = 0.2, x 0 = 0.45 and x 0 = 0.75. Moreover, the autocorrelations of the stringX are shown in Fig. 1 , which is closely related to the delta function, indicating that the chaotic entanglement between two sequences is compatible with quantum encryption due to the characteristic of good pseudorandom performance.
As a permutation structure, the STCM-based encryption algorithm shuffles the subscripts of the random string M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } by the position string R. The algorithm conquers a flaw of short periodicity by the entanglements of the initial relationship and rearranged position of m i based on chaotic stringm i . Furthermore, the elements of X could be updated and this feature can be well suited for our secure multiparty computation.
III. QUANTUM MULTISIGNATURE PROTOCOL
Without loss of generality, a user submits a document to department 1, department 2, . . . , department n, and each department needs to review the information and sign. In the protocol, four characters and their roles are defined: a trusted arbitrator, a message sender, Alice, a verifier, Bob and several signers, Charlie 1 , Charlie 2 , . . . , Charlie n (the authorized approvers of the company). We are now ready to introduce the sequential QMS protocol including the following steps: initial phase, individual signing phase, combined multiple signing phase, eavesdropping check and verification phase. First, the four communicators distribute their secret keys, and Alice prepares her message. Second, each signer signs the message and obtains a set of quantum messages and a combined multiple signature. Third, all the signers and Alice check whether the safety channels are reliable. Finally, Bob verifies the signature of each signers with the help of arbitrator's.
A. INITIAL PHASE
Step 1.1 Alice shares secret key 0 < K A < n with the arbitrator. Similarly, Bob shares secret key 0 < K B < n with the arbitrator. These results may be achieved by operating QKD protocols because of their unconditional security. The arbitrator shares initial parameters x 0 with each signer. Then, they carry out the chaotic algorithm entanglement encryption and generate position strings R i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Step 1.2 Alice obtains a sequence whose length is n + (n + 1)ξ .
where d = n, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n + (n + 1)ξ }. Based on the sequence A, she prepares a sequential string in a length of [n + (n + 1)ξ ]-qudit |A ,
where a j ∈ Z d = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}. Here, note that the classical sequence A is a known message, and copies can be made.
Step 1.3 Alice generates parity parameters W and shares them with the arbitrator,
Step 1. 4 The d-level QFT operator F d is a linear operator, which is a classical discrete Fourier transform acting on the vector of amplitudes of a quantum state [41] .
The d-level QFT can be defined by the following formula,
where j ∈ Z d and ω = 2πi
. Based on these two mutually unbiased bases, quantum states as information carriers and processing capabilities can be accomplished in cryptography protocols. The quantum cryptography algorithm can be denoted as follows,
Step 1.5 After performing the QFT operator on |A , Alice obtains a particle sequence |P , and sends it to the first signer, Charlie 1 ,
B. THE SIGNING PHASE 1) THE INDIVIDUAL SIGNING PHASE
Step 2.1 Upon receipt of the photon string |P , Charlie 1 randomly chooses ξ photons as the sample. Then, Charlie 1 takes measurements of sample photons in the basis MB 0 or MB 1 . The selection of the basis is of equal probability. Obviously, Charlie does not know which basis is correct. Then, Charlie 1 writes down the sequence of the basis as well as the measurement results, which will be compared in Step 3.3. The rest of the photons form a new sequence |P 1 .
Step 2.2 For the individual signing operation, a set of d ×d unitary matrices E x d exists,
in which x ∈ Z d , the symbol ⊕ denotes addition modulo d,
Consequently, the operators E x d (x = 0) will result in vectors with both bit-flipping and phase-flipping. Taken together, this can be expressed as
where j ∈ Z d . Based on these excellent characteristics, we use the above equation to encode the encrypted quantum state as follows. Charlie 1 generates a secret random numerical string
He then carries out the operation of C 1 on the photon string |P 1 . Specifically, the c j 1 operation E c j d is executed on the j th photon of string |P 1 . Then, Charlie 1 reshuffles these particles and gets a photon string |P 2 in a new order. To be specific, he shifts the data into the right position in circular manner. This operation can be denoted as a rotate right function f 1 : x → x + l 1 mod (n + nξ ), where a positive integer l 1 is chosen at random. The operation results in moving the position of the j th particle into f 1 (j) [42] . Then, Charlie 1 sends sequence |P 2 to Charlie 2 .
2) THE COMBINED MULTIPLE SIGNATURE GENERATION PHASE
Step 3.1 Charlie 2 , Charlie 3 , . . . , and Charlie n each carry out the individual signing phase as Step 2.1 and 2.2. To be specific, Charlie z (z = 2, 3, . . . , n) chooses ξ photons of |P z . These photons are measured randomly with basis MB 0 or MB 1 . Then, Charlie z encodes his private string on the remaining particles
(13) Then, he generates a random positive integer l z and builds a rotate right function f z . Charlie z shifts the data into the right position based on function f z . Then, the photon string |P z+1 is transmitted to Charlie z+1 . All the signers complete the processing until the last signatory Charlie n transmits string |P n+1 to Alice.
Step 3.2 Alice chooses ξ samples from |P n+1 and measures them randomly with MB 0 or MB 1 . Then, she generates the multisig of the message by encrypting |P n+1 with unitary matrices E K A d . Specifically, the operation E K A d is executed on every photon of string |P n+1 .
Step 3.3 Alice sends the signature |S to Bob. Then, Alice sends A to Bob via QKD.
C. EAVESDROPPING CHECK
Step 4.1 Bob encrypts |S and |P using the key K B and sends the outcomes Y B = E K B d (|S , |P ) to the arbitrator. The arbitrator decrypts Y B with K B and gets |S and |P .
Step 4.2 Charlie 1 carries out his eavesdropping check with the help of the arbitrator. He is required to announce the positions and measurement basis of his sample particles. If the measurement basis is correct, the result is valid. Approximately half of these selected samples are invalid because of incorrect basis. According to the parity parameters W shared with Alice, the arbitrator compares the photon on the same position in |P with results of the valid samples. With the wrong measurement base (50%), the accuracy of the measurement results is (50%). In theory, the threshold for qubit error rate is 25%. The rest step of the scheme will be aborted when the error rate exceeds the threshold level.
Step 4. 3 Similarly, Charlie 2 , Charlie 3 , . . . , and Charlie n execute their eavesdropping checks in sequence. Specifically, Charlie z−1 declares his random positive integer l z−1 , the arbitrator and Alice discard the samples and rearrange the sequence in |P . Charlie z announces the positions and measurement results of his sample particles (approximately 50% of the results are valid). Then, the arbitrator measures the particles of the corresponding position in rearranged |P with suitable bases. Accordingly, Charlie 1 , Charlie 2 ,..., and Charlie z−1 update the secret string {C 1 , C 2 , ..., C z−1 }. They declare the corresponding operations on samples as described in {C 1 , C 2 , ..., C z−1 }. The expected results of samples states are calculated using public information and initial states in rearranged |P . By comparing the expected results with the measurement results of Charlie z , the arbitrator is able to learn the safety of transforming among the signatories. Finally, Alice declares position information and measurement results of her samples. The arbitrator requires all signatories to publish the related position operations. Based on the published information, the arbitrator is able to calculate the error rate. In this manner, the arbitrator is able to learn the safety of transforming between the signatories and Alice.
D. VERIFYING PHASE
Step 5.1 After discarding the sample photons, the arbitrator renews the quantum strings and obtains |P 0 ,
Then, he decodes |S with key K A and gets the multisig |P n+1 .
Step 5.2 Similarly, each user Charlie z updates his numerical string C z and obtains a new string. Based on this string, he transforms his private set C z to another secret string, 
where s j z is the exact value of c r j z . Then, each signer executes a process like the process described above. Finally, they announce S z to the classical public channel.
Step 5. 4 The arbitrator decrypts S z based on the chaotic position string {R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n } and obtains S z . He calculates
He performs the t j operation E t j d on the j th photon of string |P 0 and obtains |P S . The arbitrator takes quantum state comparison between |P S and |P n+1 . If |P S = |P n+1 , the arbitrator sets the verification parameter V = 1; otherwise, he sets V = 0. The arbitrator obtains |P 0 from |P S and transmits the private message Y aB = E K B d (|S , |P 0 , V ) back to the verifier Bob.
Step 5.5 Bob decrypts Y aB and gets (|S , |P 0 , V ). If V = 0, Bob considers that the multisig is not valid; otherwise, Bob carries out the next few steps.
Step 5. 6 Based on updated sequences A and W , Bob generates sequence |P 0 , which is compared with |P 0 . If |P 0 = |P 0 , Bob accepts the multisig |S of |P 0 ; otherwise, he rejects it.
The communications in our protocol are illustrated in Fig. 2 .
IV. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
For a QMS scheme, since the channels among the participants are much more than the triplet scheme, the security is complicated. In what follows, we provide a multisig processing example to prove the correctness. Moreover, we discuss the security of the proposed QMS scheme for two aspects: impossibility of forgery and impossibility of disavowal.
A. CORRECTNESS
In this section, let us consider a general case as an example to demonstrate the correctness of the above scheme. First, in the case of n > 2, suppose that there are six signatories, Charlie 1 , Charlie 2 , Charlie 3 , . . . , and Charlie 6 . Therefore, we can see that d = 6 and n = 6. To make the major process clear, we mainly demonstrate the phase of signing and verifying, without regard to the eavesdropping checks. Thus, the |P 1 sequence is the quantum particles of |P 0 . In Step 1.2, Alice generates the classical random string A = {5, 3, 1, 0, 2, 3}(see Table 1 ), where W = {0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1}. In step 2.2, the arbitrator performs the t j operation E t j d on the j th particle of the sequence |P 0 and obtains |P S . In step 5.4, the arbitrator takes the quantum states comparison between |P S and |P 7 . As shown in Table 1 , |P S = |P 7 , the arbitrator sets the verification parameter V = 1.
Second, in the case of n = 2, suppose that there are two signatories, Charlie 1 and Charlie 2 . Like the above example, we can set d = 2 and n = 2. However, the algorithms in the protocol are carried out in 2-dimensional quantum systems, and there are only two possible results of rotating right shift. It may lead to some security problems, which will be mentioned in the security analysis. Therefore, in the case of signature by two people, dimension parameter d need to increase. Here, we can set d = 6 and n = 2. In Step 1.2, Alice generates the classical random string A = {5, 3} (see Table 2 ), where W = {0, 1}. In step 2.2, the arbitrator performs the t j operation E t j d on the j th particle of sequence |P 0 and obtains |P S . In step 5.4, the arbitrator takes the quantum states comparison between |P S and |P 3 . As shown in Table 2 , |P S = |P 3 , the arbitrator sets the verification parameter V = 1. Overall, the condition d ≥ n should be satisfied in this scheme.
B. IMPOSSIBILITY OF FORGERY
For a signature protocol, there are two elements, which are the message |P and the signature |S . In the proposed protocol, the verifier checks both the authenticity of |S and integrity of |P with the help of the arbitrator. In the following section, we analyze that the two elements cannot be forged by the external and internal attackers.
1) EXTERNAL ATTACKERS
If an external attacker, Eve, attempts to make the message |P , she has to steal the private keys (K A , K B ) as well as the parity parameter W that is held by Alice and Bob. However, the safety of K A and K B is guarded by the QKD protocol in
Step 1.1. As we know, QKD can realize reliable transfers of classical and quantum states over long distances [43] , [44] . The verifier Bob would discover the counterfeiting of the plain text in Step 5.6 if the condition |P 0 = |P 0 is not met in this attack.
If Eve attempts to counterfeit multisig |S , she has to steal the Charlie z 's individual secret random numerical string C z as well as the initial parameter x 0 that is managed by the legal participator. However, the secret random numerical string C z is guaranteed by the chaotic entanglement encryption with the key x 0 . This is impossible for an external attacker due to its pseudorandom performance. The arbitrator would actually discover the counterfeiting of the multisig in Step 5.4 if the condition |P S = |P n+1 is not met in this attack.
2) INTERNAL ATTACKERS
Forgery of the multisig is more accessible when an internal attacker knows parts of the private parameter in the protocol. As the participant in the protocol, Alice generates the message |P , and the signers execute encoding; they can utilize these opportunities to execute attacks. In the following section, two types of attack behaviors will be discussed: eavesdropping of C z and modification of (|P , |S ).
Case 1: Eavesdropping of C z If a malicious Alice attempts to forge multisig, she should learn Charlie z 's individual sequence C z . To obtain the information about the operation E c j d , Alice can perform entangle-ancillary attack. In Step 1.2, Alice generates the quantum state string |P 0 followed by an ancillary photon. After performing unitary operations, the ancillary photons are entangled with signal photons. In Step 2.1, Alice may utilize this ancillary photon to reveal something about S 1 .
Without loss of generality, we calculate the probability that Alice can obtain Charlie 1 's random string. Suppose that the signal photon is photon 1 and the ancillary photon is photon 2. The unitary operation that Alice is able to apply to these two photons could be described by the following formula:
in which y ∈ Z d . The states |ε y,k are pure ancillary particles that are uniquely determined by the unitary operation. The unitary property of U could be denoted as follows
in which y, y ∈ Z d and δ y,y = 0 (or 1) when y = y (or y = y ). Therefore, if photon 1 is generated in the state of |v (v ∈ Z d ) in the initial phase, the whole system will evolve into the state of
According to the parity parameters W, some of the particles have performed the QFT operation. Thus, if the signal photon is generated as F d |v in the initial phase, then the whole system will evolve into the state of
If the position of photon 1 is j th in the string of |P 0 , Charlie 1 encodes his value c j 1 on the photon. Then, two particles denoted in Eq. (21) and (21) are going to evolve into the quantum states as shown below:
After receiving the particles, Alice may use the difference between ρ 0 = Tr 1 (| 0 
where n is the number of signers, and ξ is the number of sample photon as shown in Eq. (13) . The greater the value of ξ is, the smaller the probability of χ . As long as the parameter ξ is large enough, Alice cannot obtain information about encoding from Charlie 1 . Case 2: Modification of (|P , |S ) Alice can modify (|P , |S ) after all the signers have performed signing. If two elements of signature pass the verification of Bob, the modified signature |S is the multiparty signing of the modified message |P . This behavior is a type of forgery of the signature. For this purpose, Alice can only carry out the same unitary matrices E x d on each particle of |P and |S after the signature of the last.
Next, we describe this type of attack in detail. Here, Alice performs an operation U on (|P , |S ), where the length of |P is n + (n + 1)ξ . The two elements of multisig will transform to
where all the values of E i d are equal. Obviously, for the signal particles, it is easy for Alice to achieve P S = P n+1 . However, the modified message |P will introduce error into the eavesdropping check particles. We can calculate the probability that all the particles on which Alice performs modifying operations are the signal particles instead of sample particles in 1 1+ξ . As a result, no matter the length of the message, the security of the signature is only related to the value of ξ . If the value of ξ is large enough, internal attackers cannot forge the multisig.
C. IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISAVOWAL
Since the message sender Alice and the signers hold the private key, they cannot disavow the two elements of multisig. However, the message signatory may disavow his signature by making an excuse of losing the private key in the classical cryptosystem. Actually, the arbitrator and the participants share the secret keys via QKD. Any disturbance to the photons in the transformation of private keys will improve the qubit error rate, and this is very easily detected.
For the individual signatories, |P z+1 contains Charlie z 's secret key C z . The physical process of chaos is compatible with an imperfect quantum system due to its pseudorandom performance and autocorrelation. The skew tent chaotic maps are used to update the shared keys. In other words, signatories generate secret keys x n in the chaotic algorithm, which are also the initial keys of the next chaotic entanglement conversion round. Furthermore, all the signatories carry out the process of the eavesdropping check, and the random string C z of each signer is composed of signal code and eavesdropping code. The signer confirms the security with the eaves-dropping code in the protocol, which implies that the verified multiparty signature is generated by legal signal code.
Since the multisig is many individual orderly generations, there could be an attack of collusion denials. If one signer is going to deny his individual signature, he needs to find another one or more signers to cooperate with him. In detail, we take two signers Charlie 1 and Charlie 2 , for example. Charlie 1 says that the one bit of his secret string is 3 (it is indeed 2), and Charlie 2 say the corresponding of his secret string is 1 (it is indeed 2). Therefor, they can deny the valid multisig by canceling each other out. However, it can be successful only when the above two bits are signal bits instead of checking bits. Therefore, we can calculate the probability of success and the factors that influence it,
where n is the total number of signal qubits, ξ is the total number of checking qubits of each signer, z is entry number of the signer that is denoted as a subscript of Charlie, and m is the number of disavowal signers. In a worst case, Charlie n plans to deny when the parameter (n − z + 1)ξ is the smallest, and the probability of success will be 1 1+ξ/n . We assume that the signer who conspires with Charlie n could achieve this maximum probability. Fig. 3 depicts the probability of three cases, where the probability of success is smaller when there are greater number of disavowal signers. In addition, the higher the value of ξ n , the lower the probability of success. As a result, Alice and the signers cannot disavow the generated multisig |S and the signing message |P when the ratio of ξ to n is large enough.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have introduced a QMS based on the QFT and chaotic system. In the proposed protocol, several signatories generate a joint multisig for a message transformed by the sender, Alice, with the chaotic entanglement algorithm. After the processing of eavesdropping check, the verifier, Bob verifies the multisig and plain text with the aid of the arbitrator. As shown in Table 3 , compared with repeated execution of AQS and broadcast QMS protocols, our protocol reduces the times of verification, which ensures the security and improves efficiency.
In theory, a multiparty signature can be achieved via our QMS protocol, which has been demonstrated by a general case of Table 1 . However, the level of the signal particles cannot be neglected any longer with an increasing number of signatories. To date, there still are some technical and economic obstacles to overcome in preparing high-level particles. Therefore, this problem will restrict the practicality of the QMS protocol. Fortunately, utilizing the principle of the well-known Chinese Remainder Theorem over a finite field [45] , the presented protocol can be carried out in lower level photons.
Before the execution of the QMS scheme, participants in the protocol agree on several positive integers, d [1] , d [2] , . . . , d [q] . The integers should satisfy the follow requirements. First, they are prime numbers. Second, the product of these integers q k=1 d[k] is greater than or equal to the total number of participants. Then, all the participants perform q rounds of protocol. In the k th round, Alice and the signatories execute operations on d[k]-level single particles. In the phase of verifying, Bob verifies quantum multisig in d[k]-level with help of the arbitrator. In the example of Table 1 , the message sender should prepare 6-level qudits, and signatories should carry out the measurements and operations on 6-level photons. Applying the novel approach to protocol can optimize the operation dimension down to a lower level. The signatories can complete their work using the prime numbers 2 and 3. They choose two integers of d[1] = 2 and d[2] = 3 and then carry out the protocol on 2-level and 3-level particles. The arbitrator calculates Eq.(18) where d = 2 and d = 3. Finally, if both rounds of multisigs pass the verifications, Bob accepts the multisig as a valid multiparty signature in 6-level.
Analysis shows that the proposed QMS scheme provides a more compact and practical approach to handle multiparty signatures. Therefore, this scheme is applicable to ecommerce, especially for requiring more than one key to authorize a Bit coin transaction or to allow multiple government bodies authorize an approval.
